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NOTES
NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION: A
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE MINNESOTA
MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE
The growing sophistication of the construstion industry has made the use of
Minnesota's Mechanics' Lien Statute more frequently litigated than ever before.
This increase in litigation has highlighted weaknesses in the present mechanics'
lien statute. This Note examines two areas of concern in the present statute and
recommends changes designed to decrease litigation in the areas of commence-
ment and completion.
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INTRODUCTION
Mechanics' liens, unlike equitable liens', are based entirely upon
statute. 2 "Mechanics' lien" is a generic term which has been defined
as:
a claim created by law for the purpose of securing a priority of pay-
ment of the price and value of the work performed and materials
furnished in erecting or repairing a building or other structure, and
as such it attaches to the land as well as the buildings erected
thereon.3
Mechanics' liens are applicable only to construction and related
1. "Although it is difficult to give an accurate and comprehensive definition of
the term 'equitable lien' . . . it frequently has been stated that such a lien is a right,
not recognized at law, to have a fund or specific property, or its proceeds, applied in
whole or in part to the payment of a particular debt or loss of debts." 51 AM.JUR. 2d
Liens, § 22 (1970).
2. H. TIFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 1574-75 (3d ed. 1939).
3. Van Stone & Stillwell v. Bierce Mfg. Co., 142 U.S. 128, 136 (1891).
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fields involved in the improvement of real estate and have no appli-
cation to personal property.4 At common law, certain merchants
were favored with the right to replevy specific goods before judg-
ment.5 This right was not available to subcontractors and suppliers
of building material to recover their contributions to the improve-
ment of real property.6 This lack of protection for subcontractors
and material suppliers made them vulnerable to unscrupulous gen-
eral contractors and property owners. 7
The purpose of mechanics' liens is to protect those who have con-
tributed supplies or labor to the improvement of real property.8
"He whose property is enhanced in value by the labor and toil of
others should be made to respond in some way by payment and full
satisfaction for what he has secured. To accomplish this result is the
intent of the lien law." 9 Mechanics' liens are therefore a method to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the owner whose property has been
improved at the expense of contractors and materialmen.O
Mechanics' lien claimants acquire security in the improvement in-
dependent of any contractual remedies that may be available against
the owner of the property.II The security provided by mechanics'
lien statutes is a remedial interest rather than an ownership inter-
est.1 2 This interest gives the claimant the right to collect monies
owed through foreclosure, and not any right to possess or use the
real property.' 3 The right to foreclose and the lack of the right to
4. Nygren, Mechanics' Liens in Minnesota, 26 BENCH & B. OF MINN., Feb. 1970, at
21.
5. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1972).
6. H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, at § 1576.
7. Mechanics' lien laws are also designed to prevent financial ruin for the over-
extended contractor or materialman.
These laws grew, and their validity became established as the courts held
that the building business did not have the protection inherent in the wide-
spread distribution of credit risk common to other businesses, and therefore
needed this broader and special protection. Contractors, sub-contractors,
materialmen, and other building groups were frequently obliged to extend
credit in larger amounts paid for longer times than other businesses. Such
parties might have their entire capital, or a substantial part of it, tied up on
one or two, or ten or twenty, projects under construction.
G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON, D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 12.4 at 736
(1985) [hereinafter OSBORNE & WHITMAN] (quoting Stalling, Mechanics' Lien Laws as
They Exist Today, 4 F.H.L.B. REV. § 232, 232 (1938)).
8. S. PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF MECHANIC'S LIENS 15-16 (3d ed. 1893).
9. Emery v. Hertig, 60 Minn. 54, 57, 61 N.W. 830, 831 (1895).
10. See 2 POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Mechanics' Liens 483 (1986)
("mechanics' liens provide ... a security device available to prevent unjust enrich-
ment of landowners at the expense of workers and materialmen who are creditors of
persons other than the landowner.").
11. Stone, Mechanics' Lien in Iowa, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 39, 42 (1980-81).
12. Id.
13. Id.
[Vol. 13
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MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE
possess the property distinguishes mechanics' liens from other types
of property interests.t4
A simple illustration of the mechanics of the operation of mechan-
ics' liens may be helpful.
O contracts with C for the construction of a garage.
C subsequently contracts with S to perform the roofing
on the garage.' 5
Ordinarily, upon the garage's completion, 0 will pay C, who will in
turn pay S. However, 0 may be unable to pay the construction costs
of the garage or actually does pay C who fails to pay S. Under either
scenario, the mechanics' lien scheme is designed to protect unpaid
contractors and subcontractors.
Both C and S,16 provided they followed the statutory guidelines,
will have a security interest in the garage. Their interests in the ga-
rage will reflect the agreed price for their contribution or the reason-
able value of their contribution.17 In the event that 0 fails to pay for
the garage, the mechanics' lien claimants may force the foreclosure
sale of the garage and satisfy their claims from the sale price. From
this elementary illustration, it is easy to see the importance of
mechanics' liens in the construction industry.18
Consistent with the general mechanics' lien concept, the Minne-
sota mechanics' lien statute "is structured to guarantee payment for
work performed on property by assigning the property as secur-
ity."19 The Minnesota mechanics' lien statute generally balances the
competing interests that are involved quite well. However, it is not
free of defects. The Minnesota mechanics' lien statute is flawed by
the operation of two sections.
The first problematic section involves the method by which the
Minnesota mechanics' lien statute determines priorities among vari-
ous lien claimants.20 The second problematic section involves the
14. Id. These characteristics, a remedial interest giving rise to a right to fore-
close but not the right to possess, are also distinctive of equitable liens. See supra note
1.
15. Because S has not contracted directly with 0, S is known as a "subcontrac-
tor." See MINN. STAT. § 514.011(2) (1984).
16. A somewhat remarkable aspect of mechanics' liens is that they provide sub-
contractors with a remedy absent contractual privity with the owner of the property.
See MINN. STAT. § 514.01 which provides for a lien "whether under contract with the
owner of such real estate or at the instance of any agent, trustee, contractor or subcontractor of
such owner .... (emphasis added).
17. See MINN. STAT. § 514.03.
18. This example will be modified to facilitate later discussion in the article.
19. Guillaume & Assocs., Inc. v. Don-John Co., 371 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
20. MINN. STAT. § 514.05.
1987]
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inherent duration of a mechanic's lien.21 More precisely, at what
point must a lien claimant affirmatively act in order to secure the lien
for possible foreclosure proceedings?
These are crucial concerns for those involved in mechanics' lien
law. This article will focus on these problems through analysis of
both the statutory language and the resulting case law. These troub-
lesome areas of the Minnesota mechanics' lien statute will then be
explored. Finally, possible improvements to these areas will be
proposed.
I. HISTORY OF MECHANICS' LIENS
As previously mentioned, mechanics' liens exist solely by virtue of
statute.2 2 A form of mechanics' lien can be traced back to Roman
Law.23 In France, the Code Napoleon allowed masons, architects,
contractors, and others employed in the construction industry a form
of mechanics' lien.24 Although historically, mechanics' liens were
well developed in the civil law,25 they were unknown in England,
either at common law or in equity. 26
This nation's first mechanics' lien statute was enacted by the Mary-
land General Assembly in 1791.27 By promulgating the statute, the
Maryland General Assembly hoped to encourage the construction of
the new capitol city of Washington. 28 The statute extended protec-
tion only to those "master builders" in direct privity with the prop-
erty owner.29 Furthermore, its authority was geographically limited
to the situs of the new capital city.30
21. See id. at § 514.08.
22. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
23. OSBORNE & WHITMAN, supra note 7, at § 12.4 at 737 (citing MACKELDY, HAND-
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 274 (Dropsie trans. 1927)).
24. Id. (citing CODE NAPOLEON, PRIVILEGES AND MORTGAGES, § 2 (2103) (1804)).
25. Id.
26. See Canal Co. v. Gordon, 73 U.S. 561, 571 (6 Wall.) (1867) ("Liens of this
kind were unknown in the common law and equity jurisprudence both of England
and of this country. They were clearly defined and regulated in the civil law.").
27. OSBORNE & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 12.4 at 736 (citing Acts of General As-
sembly of Maryland, ch. 45, § 10 (1791)).
28. See Moore-Mansfield Const. Co. v. Indianapolis N.C. & T. Ry. Co., 179 Ind.
356, 101 N.E. 296 (1913). The court stated:
The origin of such laws in America arose from the desire to establish and
improve, as readily as possible, the city of Washington. In 1791, at a meet-
ing of the commissioners appointed for such purpose, both Thomas Jeffer-
son and James Madison were present, and a memorial was adopted urging
the General Assembly of Maryland to pass an act securing to master builders a
lien on houses erected and land occupied. The requested law was enacted
December 19, 1791.
Id. at 369, 101 N.E. at 301. (emphasis in the original).
29. See supra note 27.
30. See, POWELL, supra note 10, at § 483 (citing Md. Laws 1791, ch. 45).
[Vol. 13
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It was not until 1803 that Pennsylvania enacted the next mechan-
ics' lien statute in this country.3' The general growth of urban con-
struction throughout the nineteenth century fostered the passage of
mechanics' liens in many states.3 2 Today every state in the Union
has such legislation.33 The national development of mechanics' lien
statutes has also seen the protection extended beyond those in priv-
ity of contract with the property owner.
II. THE MINNESOTA MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE
Mechanics' liens have existed in Minnesota since March of 1858,
nearly two months before Minnesota attained statehood.34 By 1888,
there had been three different versions of mechanics' liens in Minne-
sota. The last of the three mechanics' liens statutes3 5 was declared
an unconstitutional violation of the state constitution.3 6 As a result,
31. Id. (citing Pa. Laws 1803). This was a temporary statute restricted to the City
of Philadelphia. A permanent statute was enacted three years later which included a
lien for those not in privity with the owner. Id.
32. Id. The constant construction and city building of the nineteenth century set
the stage for statutes dealing with mechanics' liens.
33. ALA. CODE § 35-11-110 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.050 (1962); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-981 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-601 (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3109 (West 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-22-101 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-33 (West 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2701 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 38-
101 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.01 (West 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-360
(1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 507-41 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 45-501 (1947); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 82, para. 1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-8-3-1 (West 1979);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 572.1 (West 1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1101 (1983); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 376.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801
(West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3251 (1980); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 9-101 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 254, § 1 (West 1959); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 570.1104 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. § 514.01 (1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-7-
131 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 429.010 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-501
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-101 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.221 (1985); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 447:1 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-64 (West 1974); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 48-2-1 (1978); N.Y. LIEN LAW § 3-39C (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 44A-7-23 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-27-01 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1311.01 (Anderson 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 141 (West 1979); OR. REV.
STAT. § 87.005 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1101 (Purdon 1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 34-28-1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-5-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 44-9-1 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-101 (1982); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 53.021 (Vernon 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 1921 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-1 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 60.04.010 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 38-2-1 (1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 779.01
(West 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 29-2-101 (1981).
34. See, Act of August 12, 1858, ch. 54, § 1, 1858 Minn. Laws 121, 121.
35. Act of March 12, 1878, ch. 3, 1878 Minn. Laws 71.
36. Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N.W. 513 (1888) (the court held the
entire mechanics' lien statute invalid since several sections were unconstitutional in
their attempt to either impose a lien without the owner's consent, authority or agree-
ment, or to subordinate all prior encumbrances).
1987]
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the state constitution was amended in 188837 to allow mechanics'
liens to include homestead property.38 The predecessor of Minne-
sota's current mechanics' lien was then enacted.39
The state constitution also provides for a lien similar to a mechan-
ics' lien.40 Such "constitutional liens" are far more restrictive in
scope than mechanics' liens.41 While the scope of mechanics' liens
42
protect those not in privity of contract with the owner of the prop-
erty, "constitutional liens" only protect those in privity of contract
with the owner.43
The Minnesota mechanics' lien statute44 protects engineers, land
surveyors, contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, and
others who contribute to the improvement of real estate by perform-
ing labor.45 To successfully assert a lien, a claimant must show three
things. First, the claimant must show that either the owner or an au-
37. Article I, Section 12 of the state constitution, as originally adopted, provided
that "a reasonable amount of property shall be exempt from seizure or sale for the
payment of any debt or liability. The amount of such exemption shall be determined
by law." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1857, amended 1888). Obviously then, the legis-
lature intended to carve out the exempted property.
The legislature did pass a law determining the amount of exempted property.
The law generally placed a blanket exemption on all defined homestead property.
See, Act of March 9, 1875, ch. 66, § 1, 1875 Minn. Laws 92, 92-93.
As a result of Meyer, the state constitution was amended in 1888. The above-
quoted passage of the constitution was amended by adding the language:
Provided, however, that all property so exempted shall be liable to seizure
and sale for any debts incurred to any person for work done or materials
furnished in the construction, repair or improvement of the same; and pro-
vided further that such liability to seizure and sale shall also extend to all
real property for any debt incurred to any laborer or servant for labor or
service performed.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 12. The effect of this amendment was to make previously ex-
empt homestead property subject to a mechanics' lien.
38. Act of February 21, 1887, ch. 2, § 1, 1887 Minn. Laws 4.
39. Act of April 24, 1889, ch. 200, §§ 1-2, 1889 Minn. Laws 313, 313-14.
40. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 12.
41. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
42. Nygren, supra note 4, at 22.
43. Id. Because subcontractors and material suppliers are not in privity of con-
tract with the owner, such claimants may have a difficult time securing a personal
judgment against the owner. Without a personal judgment, a claimant will have
nothing upon which to base a "constitutional lien." In Lundstrom Constr. Co. v.
Dygert, 254 Minn. 224, 94 N.W.2d 527, (1959) the court noted the difficulty of ac-
quiring a personal judgment against a homeowner absent privity:
[I]t is generally recognized that, other than the statutory right to a mechan-
ics' lien or other special statutory remedies, subcontractors and materialmen
have no right to a personal judgment against the owner where there is no con-
tractual relation between them.
Id. at 232, 94 N.W.2d at 533 (emphasis in original).
44. MINN. STAT. §§ 514.01-.959. The correct name of the applicable statute is
"Liens, Labor, Material."
45. Id. § 514.01.
[Vol. 13
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thorized agent 46 contracted for the supply of material or labor. Sec-
ond, the claimant must show that it actually furnished material or
labor for the improvement. And finally, the claimant must show that
it furnished material or labor for one of the stated purposes of sec-
tion 514.01.47
III. A NEED FOR CHANGE
It has been persuasively argued that the construction industry
breeds more civil litigation than any other aspect of our society.48
Minnesota has not avoided this unfortunate phenomenon.49 This
quantity of litigation is an increased burden on our overloaded court
system, is time consuming, and is ultimately responsible for in-
creased construction costs. Since mechanics' liens are a vital part of
the construction industry and the construction industry is a vital part
of our economy, it is important that measures are taken to improve
Minnesota's mechanics' lien statute.
A. Minnesota Statutes Section 514.05
Perusal of the Minnesota's mechanics' lien statute for problem ar-
eas leads inexorably to section 514.05. This section has been, and
will continue to be, the source of more litigation than any other sec-
tion of the Minnesota mechanics' lien statute. Section 514.05 states
in pertinent part:
As against a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or encumbrancer
without notice, no lien shall attach prior to the actual and visible begin-
ning of the improvement on the ground .... 50
The importance of section 514.05 is that it determines the priority
in which liens will be satisfied upon foreclosure. 5' Referring back to
46. Id.
47. Anderson v. Breezy Point Estates, 283 Minn. 490, 494, 168 N.W.2d 693, 696
(1969). In Anderson, the court held the surveyors' staking of the property was insuffi-
cient to meet the purposes of the statute. Id. at 495, 168 N.W.2d at 697. MINN. STAT.
§ 514.01 was amended in 1974 to include "land surveying services" as one of the
enumerated purposes of the statute. Act of April 9, 1974, ch. 381, 1974 Minn. Laws
683.
48. Comment, The Release Bond Statutes: Achieving Balance in the Mechanics' Lien
Laws, 28 UCLA L. REV. 95 (1980).
49. See, e.g., R. B. Thompson,Jr. Lumber Co. v. Windsor Dev. Corp., 383 N.W.2d
357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)(three consolidated actions from two counties involving
foreclosure actions on mechanics' liens on three pieces of property owned by defend-
ant);Jesco, Inc. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 357 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)(three
consolidated actions to determine priority and amount of mortgage and mechanic's
lien).
50. MINN. STAT. § 514.05.
51. "All such liens, as against the owner of the land, shall attach and take effect
from the time the first item of material or labor is furnished upon the premises for
1987]
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the introductory illustration, imagine that C not only contracted with
S for the construction of the garage, but that he also contracted with
S 1, S2 and S3 for laying the concrete foundation, for the electrical
work and for the painting of the garage. Also imagine that 0 has
financed the entire project through M who takes a mortgage on the
project. The once elementary scenario has become very complex
and the lien priority issue becomes crucial.
Since there are a number of claimants, the assets generated from a
foreclosure sale may be insufficient to satisfy all claims. The pro-
ceeds from a foreclosure sale are particularly likely to be insufficient
where the court has determined that the interest of a party holding
less than a fee interest52 is subject to the lien claims. In such a case,
the only interest subject to the judicial sale may be the improvement
severed from the land. Generally, an improvement, if capable of sev-
erance from the underlying property, has a substantially decreased
value.53 There are a variety of scenarios that illustrate the impor-
tance of the priority issue.54
In our example, the troublesome language of section 514.05,
quoted above, pertains directly to M's priority. According to the
statutory language, M's mortgage will generally have priority over C,
S, S1, S2 or 83 until the "actual and visible beginning of the im-
provement on the ground."55 In other words, until C, S, S 1, 82 and
S3 have either delivered materials that can be seen 56 to the garage
site or have begun construction that can be seen on the garage, M's
mortgage will have priority over their mechanics' liens. The logical
import of the "actual and visible beginning of the improvement on
the beginning of the improvement, and shall be preferred to any mortgage or other
encumbrance not then of record .... " Id.
52. See Benjamin v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 517, 26 N.W. 725 (1886) ("owner" as used
in Minnesota's mechanics' lien statute does not require proof of absolute ownership
but may include any interest which court may order sold).
53. Stone, supra note 11, at 97.
54. Id.
55. MINN. STAT. § 514.05. Any contractor or subcontractor may record a con-
tract for an improvement before commencement of any visible improvement thus
providing constructive notice to all interested parties.
56. A reading of this section does not clearly establish that mere delivery of ma-
terial to a site should establish priority for a mechanics' lien claimant over a mortga-
gee. The language of the statute expressly states that liens shall attach against
owners "from the time the first item of material or labor is furnished upon the prem-
ises for the beginning of the improvement." MINN. STAT. § 514.05.
No such express language exists when addressing lien priority as against mortga-
gees. The statute uses entirely different language stating, "[N]o lien shall attach
prior to the actual and visible beginning of the improvement on the ground." None-
theless, the Minnesota Supreme Court has failed to recognize the distinction in the
statutory language. SeeJadwin v. Kasal, 318 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1982); Landers-Mor-
rison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassador Holding Co., 171 Minn. 445, 214 N.W. 503
(1927).
[Vol. 13
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the ground" language is that, before executing any loan agreements,
mortgagees and other encumbrancers of property concerned about
their lien priority should view the property securing the loans.
1. Judicial Interpretation of Section 514.05
The philosophy of the visible commencement standard was an-
nounced by Justice Mitchell in Wentworth v. Tubbs:57
[I]t would be very unjust if the land could be afterwards swallowed
up by mechanics' liens for work which had not been commenced on
the ground, and of which consequently one who might buy the
property or take a mortgage upon it had no notice or means of
knowledge when he took his deed or his mortgage. 58
There should be no objection to fixing the date of a lien's attach-
ment by something that can be discovered by viewing the land itself.
As a practical matter, however, just what constitutes visible com-
mencement on the ground is often a difficult question. In spite of
the long-standing difficulties that courts have had with this stan-
dard,59 nearly half of the states have basically the same standard.60
The date of the visible beginning of the improvement has even
greater significance when it is realized that all mechanics' lien claim-
ants date their priority from the date of the visible beginning of the
improvement. 61 Although section 514.05 does not expressly pro-
vide for this construction, courts have long recognized this interpre-
tation. 62 In Glass v. Freeburg,6 the Minnesota Supreme Court
explained the reasonableness of this interpretation. Visible evidence
of an improvement can, supposedly, be easily ascertained. The court
noted that once visible evidence of an improvement has occurred,
any reasonably prudent person should know that a variety of materi-
57. 53 Minn. 388, 55 N.W. 543 (1893).
58. Id. at 395, 55 N.W. at 544.
59. Other jurisdictions have wrestled with this difficult issue as well. See, e.g.,
Planters Lumber Co. v.Jack Collier East Co., 234 Ark. 1091, 356 S.W.2d 631 (1962)
(construed commencement of visible improvements to be the date of first delivery of
materials for the improvement); Sheridan, Inc. v. Palchanis, 172 So. 2d 872 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965) (materials furnished for layout work on vacant lot did not constitute
visible commencement of operations); Maule Indus., Inc. v. Gaines Constr. Co., 157
So. 2d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (removing dirt and scarifying land did not con-
stitute the visible commencement of the improvement); Rupp v. Earl H. Cline &
Sons, Inc., 230 Md. 573, 188 A.2d 146 (1963) (removal of soil from one lot and
placing it in another was at most only preparatory work and was not commencement
of the improvement that would give the mechanics' lien claimants priority).
60. See KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE 214 (1972).
61. Glass v. Freeburg, 50 Minn. 386, 390, 52 N.W. 900, 901 (1892) (subcontrac-
tor's lien attaches when lien of the original contractor attaches by virtue of the con-
tract relationship between the parties).
62. Id.
63. Id.
1987]
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als and labor may be necessary to complete the improvement.6 4
Convinced that general contractors generally subcontract out some
portion of an improvement project, the Glass court reasoned that if
mortgagees "see fit to take a mortgage under such circumstances
they assume the risk of its being subordinated to all liens which may
attach to the premises for labor or materials for the completion of
the building in accordance with the contract."
65
An examination of case law decided under section 514.05 illus-
trates the confusion and uncertainty created by the nebulous "visible
commencement" standard. The courts, which must struggle with
this standard, have oftentimes yielded inconsistent results.66 Per-
haps more importantly, the parties themselves have demonstrated a
total lack of understanding of the concepts involved and their impor-
tance in establishing a standard to decide whether a beginning of an
improvement was visible. The beginning of an improvement is visi-
ble if it would be found during a reasonably diligent inspection of
the property. 67 The logical question arising from this standard is
what constitutes a "reasonably diligent search"?
The facts of Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps,68 a thoroughly confus-
ing case, touched upon the issue of "a reasonably diligent search."
Reuben E. Johnson Co. involved the issue of whether surveying stakes
allegedly in place prior to the recordation of the mortgage consti-
tuted the visible beginning of the improvement. 69 During the trial,
agents for the mortgagee testified that they "walked about the prop-
erty" but saw no stakes in the tall weeds. 70
Although the court in Reuben E. Johnson Co. did not embrace a "rea-
64. Id. at 390, 52 N.W. at 901.
65. Id.
66. Compare Lampert Yards, Inc. v. Thompson-Wetterling Constr. & Realty, Inc.,
302 Minn. 83, 223 N.W.2d 418 (1974) (stakes with attached 2 x 4 boards and string
around perimeter of proposed building did not constitute visible commencement)
with R.B. Thompson, Jr. Lumber Co., 383 N.W.2d at 360 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stakes
rising three and one-half feet above ground and topped with red fabric did constitute
visible commencement).
67. Kloster-Madsen, Inc. v. Tafi's, Inc., 303 Minn. 59, 64, 226 N.W.2d 603, 607
(1973) ("[T]he test is whether the person performing the duty of examining the
premises to ascertain whether an improvement has begun is able in the exercise of
reasonable diligence to see it."); Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279 Minn. 107,
113, 156 N.W.2d 247, 251 (1968) ("[A] person using reasonable diligence in examin-
ing the premises must be able to see the actual and visible beginning of the improve-
ment."); Wentworth, 53 Minn. at 395, 55 N.W. at 544 ("[T]he liens of mechanics or
materialmen all attach as of the date of the performance of the first work or the deliv-
ery of the first material on the ground.").
68. 279 Minn. 107, 156 N.W.2d 247 (1968).
69. Id. It is unclear when the staking was done but a witness testified that he saw
the stakes on the property about a week before the mortgage was recorded. Id. at
111, 156 N.W.2d at 250.
70. Id.
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sonably diligent search" standard, perhaps it can be inferred that it
involves, at the very least, physically walking over the property.71
However, it is difficult to glean a standard from Reuben E. Johnson Co.
because it was decided upon the court's belief that the "survey was
not an improvement." 72
The burden of making a reasonably diligent search was considera-
bly lessened by the holding in Lampert Yards, Inc. v. Thompson-Wet-
terling Constr. & Realty Inc .73 Lampert Yards again involved those
troublesome survey stakes. 74 The lien claimant apparently had done
the surveying work and installed the stakes one day before the mort-
gage was recorded.75
The court rejected the lien claimant's argument that Reuben E.
Johnson Co. required the mortgagee, in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, to actually walk over the property. 76 Instead, the court stated:
"The legislative intent.. .would not be served by a rule of law which
established statutory notice whenever such slight structures as then
existed could be discovered only by tramping the fields of an in-
tended construction site." 77 In its holding, the court stated that
71. See id.
72. Id. at 114, 156 N.W.2d at 252. A confusing aspect of Reuben E. Johnson Co. is
the court's apparent determination that, even if the mortgagee has notice that the
staking of the property had occurred, it would prevail over the mechanics' lien claim-
ant. Id. at 115-16, 156 N.W.2d at 252-53.
Earlier, the court stated that "if the mortgagee has notice of the furnishing of
material or labor upon the premises for the beginning of the improvement, he stands
in the same position as the owner." Id. at 113, 156 N.W.2d at 251. This implies that
if the mortgagee knew the staking has occurred, it, like the owner of the property,
would be subject to the lien.
Yet the court, later in the opinion, rejects this very notion. The mechanics' lien
claimant argued that the mortgagee had actual notice of the staking. Id. at 115, 156
N.W.2d at 252. The court rejects this argument based generally on the mechanical
philosophy that a lien does not attach against a mortgagee without actual, visible
beginning of the improvement. Id. at 115-16, 156 N.W.2d at 252-53. In support of
its position, the court cites several cases where mechanics' lien claimants argued that
mortgagees had actual notice of contemplated improvements. Id.
The cases cited by the court are easily distinguished from the facts of Reuben E.
Johnson Co. In Reuben E. Johnson Co., the improvements were actual and not merely
contemplated. Id. at 111, 156 N.W.2d at 250.
See also Knutson, Inc. v. Westchester, Inc., 374 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (in dicta, the court acknowledged the appeal of holding mortgagees in the
same position as owners if they have notice of surveying or architectural services
rendered but not yet visible). But see Jadwin v. Kasal, 318 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1982)
(actual notice by mortgagee of architectural services rendered prior to a visible be-
ginning does not deprive a mortgagee of priority).
73. 302 Minn. 83, 223 N.W.2d 418 (1974).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 85-86, 223 N.W.2d at 420.
76. Id. at 88, 223 N.W.2d at 421.
77. Id.
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"such notice is not given where nothing can be seen . . .from the
edge of the field."78
Shortly after Lampert Yards, the court, in Kloster-Madsen, Inc. v.
Taft's, Inc.79 revived the apparently slumbering "reasonably diligent
search" standard.SO In Kloster-Madsen, the lien claimant, without the
knowledge of the mortgagee or the vendor of the property, began
work on the vendee's remodeling plans. The work done on a large
three-story building consisted of removing four light fixtures and in-
stalling them elsewhere, removing two electric outlets, and cutting a
"crawl hole" in the ceiling.8
The court determined that the lien claimant had priority over the
mortgagee by virtue of the visible beginning of the improvement. 8
2
The court rejected the mortgagee's argument that "the improve-
ment although 'visible to the naked eye,' must also be discernible to
'the mind's eyes insofar as they tell one's mind that an improvement
has been commenced.' "83 The court also affirmed the lower court's
decision based in part upon testimony regarding "the mortgagee's
knowledge of contemplated improvements." 84
The mortgagee in Kloster-Madsen was faced with a formidable "rea-
sonably diligent search" burden. In a large three story structure, it
was held to have constructive notice of "improvements" that in real-
ity were quite insignificant. Apparently, the mortgagee in Kloster-
Madsen should have thoroughly searched each room of the building.
In considering the "reasonably diligent search" standard at this
point, two conclusions may be reached. First, it places a more signif-
icant burden than before on all mortgagees. And second, it places a
greater burden of discovering visible improvements on mortgagees
of buildings than on mortgagees of land. Unfortunately, the case law
does little to illuminate these questions.
The mortgagee's argument, rejected by the court in Kloster-Madsen,
that there should be some subjectivity in the visible beginning deter-
mination,8 5 does have support in the policies of requiring a visible
78. Id. at 88, 223 N.W.2d at 422.
79. 303 Minn. 59, 226 N.W.2d 603 (1975).
80. Id. at 64, 226 N.W.2d at 607.
81. Id. at 61-62, 226 N.W.2d at 606.
82. Id. at 64, 226 N.W.2d at 607.
83. Id.
84. Id. Using the mortgagee's knowledge of contemplated improvements to de-
prive it of priority violates the principles established in a long line of Minnesota
cases. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
85. The mortgagee's test for visibility included not only visible to the eye, but
"also be discernible to the mind's eyes insofar as they tell one's mind that an im-
provement has been commenced." Id.
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beginning.8 6 Since the standard was established to protect mortga-
gees from hidden liens, it makes little sense to hold a mortgagee re-
sponsible for "visible improvements" that are not recognized as
such. This problem is compounded by the fact that mortgagees
often do not know what to look for when inspecting property.8 7
In a very recent case, Jesco, Inc. v. Home Life Insurance Co.,88 the
court again addressed a surveying stake case. InJesco, the lien claim-
ants had completed surveying work several months prior to the rec-
ordation of the mortgage.89 The thirteen stakes marking the
perimeter of the proposed building stuck out of the ground approxi-
mately twenty-four inches to thirty inches and had orange strips of
material tied to the ends.90 The testimony at trial indicated that
some of the stakes may have been visible but others were obscured
by the tall weeds at the time of the mortgagee's inspection. 9'
The mortgagee's agent spent approximately an hour inspecting
the site. He walked around the perimeter and also took pictures of
the property. 92 The agent saw no stakes during the inspection. The
court held that this inspection did not meet the "reasonably dili-
gent" search test.9 3
TheJesco court based its decision on the 1974 amendment to sec-
tion 514.05.94 The court determined that only through this amend-
86. See Wentworth, 53 Minn. at 395, 55 N.W. at 544.Justice Mitchell discussed the
policy underlying the visibility test:
[I]t would be very unjust if the land could be afterward swallowed up by
mechanics' liens for work which had not been commenced on the ground,
and of which consequently one who might buy the property or take a mort-
gage upon it had no notice or means of knowledge when he took his deed or
his mortgage.
Id.
87. Knutson, 374 N.W.2d at 487 (agent failed to look for any stakes);Jesco, 357
N.W.2d at 127 (the agent for the mortgagee who was sent to inspect the property
stated that he was not looking for surveying work "because he was not aware that it
had any significance.").
88. Jesco, 357 N.W.2d at 123.
89. Id. at 124.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Recall that this inspection was similar, if not identical, to the inspection
found satisfactory in Lampert Yards. See supra note 73-78 and accompanying text.
93. 357 N.W.2d at 127.
94. Id. In 1974, the Minnesota legislature amended section 514.05 by adding
two sentences to its end:
Engineering or land surveying services with respect to real estate shall not
constitute the actual and visible beginning of the improvement on the
ground referred to in this section, except when such engineering or land
surveying services include a visible staking of the premises. No lien shall
attach for engineering or land surveying services rendered with respect to a
purchaser for value if the value of those services does not exceed $250.
Act of April 9, 1974, ch. 381, § 2, 1974 Minn. Laws 683, 683-84. This amendment
makes it clear that mortgagees are charged with notice of visible surveying work.
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ment could surveying work constitute the visible beginning of the
improvement.95 Before the 1974 amendment, the Jesco court rea-
soned, the holding in Anderson v. Breezy Point Estates96 prevented sur-
veying work from ever constituting the visible beginning of an
improvement.97 Because surveying stakes could now constitute the
visible commencement of the improvement, the court believed that a
more thorough search was necessary than was required in Lampert
Yards.98
TheJesco court also stated that a number of circumstances affect
the determination of when a beginning of an improvement consti-
tutes the visible beginning.99 Among the circumstances considered
are the condition of the property and the mortgagee's knowledge of
plans or improvements.100 The court in Kloster-Madsen mentioned
these factors as well.lot Unfortunately, it is unclear what weight
these circumstances have. Moreover, it has been held that such ex-
trinsic factors should not enter into the visible improvement-reason-
ably diligent search analysis.102
95. Jesco, 357 N.W.2d at 127.
96. 283 Minn. 490, 168 N.W.2d 693 (1969).
97. Jesco, 357 N.W.2d at 127. A close reading of Anderson does not support this
proposition. In Anderson, a surveyor was attempting to establish a mechanics' lien for
his own services. There was no issue of priority involved. The court stated:
[W]e have in the past considered and rejected the claim that the work of a
surveyor constitutes the "actual and visible beginning of the improvement
on the ground" within the provisions of Minn. St. 514.05 so as to establish a
priority among secured claimants ...
Anderson, 283 Minn. at 494, 168 N.W,2d at 696 (citations omitted). The cited cases
do not hold that surveying work cannot constitute the visible beginning of the im-
provement. While in both cases the surveying work was held not to be a visible be-
ginning of the improvement, the cases so held because the work could not be seen in
the exercise of reasonable diligence. In both cases the courts applied the traditional
visible beginning analysis. A more reasonable reading of Anderson indicates that the
court rejected the idea that surveying services were lienable. There is little, if any,
support in Anderson for the proposition that surveying services are incapable of con-
stituting the visible commencement of an improvement.
98. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
99. 357 N.W.2d at 126-27.
100. Id. at 127.
101. 303 Minn. at 63-65, 226 N.W.2d at 607-08.
102. It seems that the court's allowing knowledge of contemplated improvements
to lower the burden of showing commencement of a visible improvement is contra-
dictory to previous holdings. The court's holding in Reuben E. Johnson Co., 279 Minn.
at 116, 156 N.W.2d at 253 rejects the idea that notice of contemplated improvements
somehow eases the lien claimant's burden of showing a visible improvement. Al-
lowing knowledge of contemplated improvements to work against the mortgagee,
according to the court, "would not accord with the purpose of the statute to fix the
relative rights and priorities of purchasers, incumbrancers, and lienholders with defi-
niteness and certainty." Id. (quoting Landers-Morrison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassa-
dor Holding Co., 171 Minn. 445, 448, 214 N.W. 503, 505 (1927)).
This same theme, that a visible improvement should be objectively obvious with-
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Most recently, in R.B. Thompson, Jr. Lumber v. Windsor Development
Corp.,los the court wrestled with the "visible beginning of the im-
provement" standard. The court reluctantly held that surveying
stakes could represent the "visible commencement of the improve-
ment."' 104 The court's reluctance to so hold was based on concern
that allowing such preparatory work to constitute the visible com-
mencement of the improvement "inject[ed] great uncertainty" into
the area of construction financing.105 The court noted that lien
claimants may tack their liens back to any visible work done on the
site, even if done years before the actual erection of the building. 106
2. Continuing Confusion
With over one hundred years of case law to interpret and clarify it,
out resort to the mortgagee's subjective knowledge of the improvement, was also
espoused inJadwin, 318 N.W.2d at 847.
103. 383 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In this case, another difficult issue,
beyond the scope of this article is highlighted. The issue involves large projects with
a number of separate developers and stages of development. The question becomes
whether all materialmen for the entire project may look back to the first visible im-
provement or the first stage of improvement in establishing lien priority.
104. Id. at 367. "From before the turn of the century, the practicing bar as well as
developers and construction financiers have acted in reliance upon the understand-
ing that priority will not attach to preparatory work such as the platting of lots, stak-
ing for grading, site grading, construction of building pads, etc." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court's concern in this area is misplaced. The time of making the
first visible improvement is not important. Rather, it is the existence of the visible
improvement that is crucial. Therefore, if a construction lender or mortgagee in-
spects the property before advancing funds, it will be on notice of any existing visible
improvements regardless of when made. Once alerted to any visible improvement,
they can determine the providence of the loan.
The court in R.B. Thompson, Jr. Lumber Co. also erroneously finds that a line of
prior cases precluded surveying stakes from constituting the first visible improve-
ment. See supra note 97 for a discussion of why survey stakes could potentially consti-
tute a first visible improvement. The court states:
If a preliminary survey ... were to be held an actual and visible beginning of
the improvement on the ground so that all liens filed thereafter would have
priority over a mortgage given to secure advances for completion of the
improvement, it is safe to say that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
procure financing for any such improvement. We do not believe that the
legislature could have intended such a result.
Id. at 366 (citing Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279 Minn. 107, 114-15, 156
N.W.2d 247, 252 (1968)).
In quoting this passage from Reuben E.Johnson Co., the court in R.B. Thompson Jr.,
Lumber Co. omitted the words "of this kind" at the beginning of the quote. The type
of preliminary survey involved in Reuben E. Johnson Co. was merely a division of prop-
erty among two different mortgages. The surveying was not necessary to any of the
improvements except to its financing. Furthermore, the court found that these stakes
were obscured by the underbrush. 279 Minn. at 114-15, 156 N.W.2d at 252. Noth-
ing in Reuben E.Johnson Co. indicates that surveying stakes visible and necessary to the
improvement cannot constitute the visible commencement of the improvement.
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section 514.05 is still shrouded in uncertainty. Just what constitutes
a "visible beginning of the improvement on the ground" remains
unclear. Is it a strictly objective test' 07 or does the mortgagee's
knowledge of contemplated improvements, among other facts, make
an otherwise invisible beginning a visible beginning?108
Equally unclear is what constitutes a "reasonably diligent search"
of the property. Has the holding injesco left the mortgagee with no
alternative but to "tramp the fields of the construction site"' 10 9 in
search of the obscure yet visible beginning of the improvement? If
indeed it has, is it a fair burden to place on the mortgagees who
generally are financing the entire project anyway?t O
Simply stated, section 514.05 does not provide interested parties
with the necessary guidance to address or even avoid costly priority
disputes. Similarly, the nebulous standards that have evolved to ad-
dress priority questions have left the courts to decide such cases on a
haphazard case-by-case basis. The vital construction industry de-
mands more certainty in this important mechanics' lien area.
3. Recommendation
In the area of priority determination, certainty should be the prin-
cipal consideration. Article Five of the Uniform Simplification of
Land Transfers Act'' provides a workable solution to the priority
dilemma. Article Five employs a notice of commencement' 2 system
107. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
108. SeeJesco, 357 N.W.2d at 127; Kloster-Madsen, 303 Minn. at 64, 226 N.W.2d at
607.
109. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Dolder v. Griffin, 323 N.W.2d 773, 779-80 (Minn. 1982);Jadwin, 318
N.W.2d 844; Kloster-Madsen,, 303 Minn. 59, 226 N.W.2d 603; Lampert Yards, 302
Minn. 83, 223 N.W.2d 418.
111. The predecessor to the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act
(USLTA) was the Uniform Mechanics Lien Act. In 1925, Herbert Hoover, then Sec-
retary of Commerce, appointed a committee for the purpose of considering a "Stan-
dard State Mechanics' Lien Act." The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws designated a committee to cooperate. After several drafts had
been presented, the final draft was approved in 1932 and was designated as the "Uni-
form Mechanics' Lien Act." In 1935, Florida substantially adopted the "Uniform
Mechanics' Lien Act." Note, Lien Rights and Construction Lending: Responsibilities and
Liabilities in Florida, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 411, 413 (1977).
In August 1943, the "Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act" was withdrawn from the
active list of Model Acts recommended for adoption by the states at the National
Conference of Commmissioners on Uniform State Laws. At that time, only Florida
had adopted the act and further acceptance was unlikely. Id. at 413-14.
Article Five of the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act is partially
based on the Florida statute that was adopted in 1963 which preserved aspects of the
Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act. See OSBORNE & WHITMAN, supra note 7, at 736.
112. See Betz, USLTA Article 5: Parts 3 & 4, 10 STETSON L. REV. 109, 110 n.5
(1978):
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to establish priorities among lien claimants.'13 This concept was de-
veloped to alleviate the difficulties inherent in the "visible com-
mencement approach" to determining lien priorities.' 14 A recorded
notice of commencement provides notice to third parties searching
the record for potential liens against the real estate and therefore,
alleviates the problem of hidden liens.115
Using the notice of commencement system, the date of recording
notice of commencement on the public record establishes lien priori-
ties.'16 There is no need to determine when construction began or
whether a beginning was "visible" or not. In addition to providing
certainty in the area of lien priority, the notice of commencement
scheme also allows an owner to designate what portion of his real
estate is subject to mechanics' liens.' 17
Under the Article Five scheme, the owner records a notice of com-
mencement before construction begins which places all parties on
notice that mechanics' liens may be filed against the property for the
time period specified in the notice.18 If a lien claimant records his
lien during this period, the lien relates back to the date the notice of
commencement was recorded. 19 It is the recordation date of the
notice of commencement that becomes the priority date as against all
third parties.120 If, however, the owner fails to record a notice of
commencement,' 2 ' a claimant is entitled to record a notice122 and
"Notice of commencement" is a notice recording device first developed in
Florida to eliminate problems associated with the visible commencement ap-
proach of dating lien claimants' priorities. Under the visible commence-
ment approach, most mechanics' liens took effect from the time of visible
commencement. The major problem associated with that approach was de-
termining with certainty when commencement of construction began and
thus, when the lien attached.
Id. (citing Ervin, Revised Mechanics' Lien Laws; the Whys and Wherefores, 37 FLA. B. J.
1095, 1096-97 (1963).
113. UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS ACT § 5-301 (1978).
114. See id. Art. 5, Introductory Comment (1978) "The notice of commencement
system permits third parties to rely on the record and, at the same time, gives all
claimants on a particular improvement equal priority no matter how many prime con-
tractors there are and no matter when the particular claimant comes on the job." Id.
at 248.
115. Id. (the commencement priority rule gives a "secret lien").
116. Id. § 5-207(b).
117. Id. § 5-203(a). See id. § 5-301(a)(1) comment 2 (by recording the notice, the
owner can control the real estate subject to liens).
118. Comment, A Comparison Between Article Five of the Uniform Simplification of Land
Transfers Act and Present Illinois Mechanics' Lien Law, 1981 S. ILL. U.L.J. 563, 577.
119. UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS ACT § 5-301(a)(3).
120. Id.
121. There are no provisions in the USLTA that make recordation of a notice of
commencement mandatory. This lack of mandatory filing has been a source of criti-
cism of the USLTA. See Comment, supra note 108, at 578-79:
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his priority date is the date he recorded.1 23 Finally, if no notice of
commencement is filed at all, the date of the visible commencement
of the improvement is referred to in establishing lien priorities.124
Although Article Five provides far more certainty in the area of
mechanics' lien priorities than present Minnesota law, it too, could
be improved. The most notable improvement to Article Five would
be a statute that provides for mandatory rather than optional owner
recordation of notice of commencement. 25 Recording a notice of
commencement would not be unduly burdensome to owners, espe-
Adoption of Article Five may leave priority to be arbitrarily determined
by when the owner decides to file a notice of commencement ....
The drafters should consider amending Article Five to require that
owners file a notice of commencement before any work begins on the im-
provement. Any owner who violates the proposed amendment should be
subject to personal liability for any damage suffered by a claimant as the
result of the claimant's low priority.
Id.
122. UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS ACT § 5-301(c) provides:
The notice of commencement may state that it is limited to a particular im-
provement project, or portion thereof, on the real estate. But the limitation
is not effective unless the particular improvement, or portion thereof, to
which it applies is stated with sufficient specificity that a claimant, by reason-
able inquiry, can determine whether his contract is covered by the notice of
commencement.
The notice of commencement concept has a dual purpose. Not only does it es-
tablish a priority date, it also protects owners by limiting the amount of real estate
subject to the lien. One commentator notes:
It will generally be to the owner's advantage to file a notice of commence-
ment prior to construction because, by doing so, the owner may limit the
real estate. The only limitation on the owner's right to limit the real estate
on which later liens will attach is that the property "described must include
all the real estate on which improvements are actually being made." If the
owner does not include all of the real estate subject to improvements, the
Act provides for damages to those wrongly deprived of benefits.
If no notice of commencement is filed, a lien attaches to all of the
owner's real estate which is improved or directly benefited. This is a situa-
tion which should be avoided by the owner. The determination of what
property is benefited will be decided by the finder of fact, and it has been
suggested that "it may be appropriate to resolve doubts on the issue in favor
of lien claimants." Finally, if the owner fails to record a notice of com-
mencement, any claimant who is entitled to record a lien may, in addition,
record a notice of commencement.
If a claimant records a notice of commencement, he may include as the
real estate subject to liens "all or any part of the contracting owner's real
estate being improved or directly benefited." This would clearly be to the
owner's disadvantage because such a recording may subject a greater por-
tion of real estate to lien liability than would the owner's notice if one had
been filed.
Comment, The Nebraska Construction Lien Act: Which Way to Lien?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 86,
108-09 (1983) (footnotes omitted). Nebraska's Construction Lien Act is modeled af-
ter Article 5 of the USLTA. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-125-159 (1984).
123. UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS ACT § 5-301(e).
124. Id. § 5-301 comment 1.
125. See Comment, supra note 118, at 579 (optional owner recordation allows pri-
ority to be arbitrarily determined by date of owner's recordation).
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cially in light of the benefits they derive by recording, and many
problems are avoided thereby. Florida126 generally requires that an
owner or his authorized agent file a notice of commencement.1 27
Authority could be granted to lien claimants to compel owners to
record a notice of commencement.12 8
In addition to mandatory recordation of notice of commencement,
Florida requires posting of the notice at the construction site.129
This additional safeguard would prevent problems with mortgagees
who fail to check the public records. Such a provision would provide
notice to those at the construction site and would eliminate the con-
tinuing need to search the public records.13o
With the aforementioned modifications, Article Five goes a long
ways towards providing certainty in the litigation-prone area of
mechanics' lien priorities. Minnesota, sorely in need of such cer-
tainty, should adopt an Article Five-type priority scheme. Adoption
of such a plan in Minnesota would not represent too dramatic a
change. Section 514.05 presently allows lien claimants with con-
tracts for improvements to record the contract, thus putting all third
parties on constructive notice of the lien for priority purposes. 13 '
Any burden created by the notice of commencement filing require-
ment is an equitable trade-off for the certainty the system would
bring to this area.
B. Minnesota Statutes Section 514.08
Further inspection of Minnesota's mechanics' lien statute for prob-
lem areas leads to section 514.08. While not as problematic, in
terms of litigation, as section 514.05, section 514.08 is responsible
for much litigation. Although section 514.08 addresses several ar-
eas,132 the concern of this discussion is the lien filing period. Section
514.08 states in pertinent part:
The lien shall cease at the end of 120 days after doing the last of
the work, or furnishing the last item of skill, material, or machinery
126. Florida has been credited with developing the "notice of commencement"
approach. Furthermore, Article 5 is based heavily on Florida Mechanics' Lien Law.
Pedowitz, USLTA,-ULTA Perspective, 57 TITLE NEws 23, 26 (Jan. 1978). See also supra
note 101.
127. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.13 (West 1984).
128. The National Association for Credit Managers has suggested the owner be
required to file the notice or face liability for damages or $200, whichever is greater.
Pedowitz, Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act- A Commentary, 13 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR.J. 696, 726 (1978).
129. FLA. STAT. § 713.13(1) (1984).
130. See Pedowitz, supra note 126, at 726.
131. MINN. STAT. § 514.05.
132. Id. Section 514.08, in addition to stating when a lien claim must be filed,
states where and in what form it must be filed.
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Because this area is controlled by statute, the 120 day period is
strictly interpreted.34 Although the parties may contract to shorten
this period or eliminate lien rights altogether, they may not extend
the statutory period.135 Since this period is strictly interpreted, in
many cases it is crucial to determine exactly when the lien filing pe-
riod begins to run.
It is when attempting to determine the date at which the lien filing
period begins to run that the weaknesses of section 514.08 become
apparent. Like the "visible beginning of the improvement" rule of
section 514.05, the rule of section 514.08 is easier stated than ap-
plied.136 Unfortunately, the date of "doing the last of the work, or
furnishing the last item of skill, material, or machinery" is not always
easy to determine.' 3 7
The strict application of the lien filing period has, of course, re-
sulted in attempts to avoid its effect. The most common, as well as
troublesome, scheme to avoid the lien filing period involves the fur-
nishing of additional labor or materials after the lien filing period has
expired. 138 The lien claimant then files a lien statement claiming the
additional labor or material constituted doing the last of the work.'s9
133. Id.
134. Armco Steel Corp., Metal Prod. Div. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 276 Minn.
133, 138, 149 N.W.2d 23, 26 (1967).
135. But see Betline Brick Co. v. Standard Home Bldg. Co., 170 Minn. 509, 213
N.W. 41 (1924) (implies that parties may agree to extend the lien filing period thus
estopping the owner from raising the defense of late filing).
136. See Kahle v. McClary, 255 Minn. 239, 240, 96 N.W.2d 243, 245 (1959) ("The
law in this area is quite clear; its application is difficult.").
137. See OSBORNE & WHITMAN, supra note 7, at 737.
138. See, e.g., Hayle Floor Covering v. First Minnesota Constr. Co., 253 N.W.2d
809, 812-13 (Minn. 1977) (incidental work not relating to construction project itself,
moving equipment and materials, not sufficient to satisfy mechanics' lien statute);
A.Y. McDonald Mfg. Co. v. Nesstone, 187 Minn. 237, 239, 244 N.W. 806, 807 (1932)
(subsequent installation of a tumbler holder and towel bar did not extend the time
for filing a lien for prior work on a sink, since the purchase and installation of these
items were considered separate and distinct contracts from the sink); Guy T. Bisbee
Co. v. Granite City Investing Co., 159 Minn. 442, 446, 199 N.W. 17, 18 (1924) (when
contract substantially completed, delaying to finish a small item for an unreasonable
time will not extend time for filing lien); Dayton v. Minneapolis Radiator & Iron Co.,
63 Minn. 48, 48, 65 N.W. 133, 133 (1895) (two hours of additional labor was consid-
ered immaterial and trifling to extend time for filing lien); Enviro-Fab, Inc. v. Blandin
Paper Co., 349 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (time for filing lien cannot be
extended by intentional and unilateral providing of minor incidental items).
139. See, e.g., Newstone, 187 Minn. at 239, 244 N.W. at 807; Enviro-Fab, 349 N.W.2d
at 846.
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1. Judicial Development
This issue has been addressed in a number of Minnesota cases.140
Unfortunately, the cases have often created more questions than
they have answered.
Many of the rules currently used to address this problem were es-
tablished in Guy T Bisbee Co. v. Granite City Investing Co. 14 t This 1924
case involved a flagrant attempt to avoid the running of the lien filing
period. The lien claimant was persuaded by the owner not to file a
lien statement because the owner was concerned that it would pre-
vent the closing of a loan agreement.' 42 When the lien claimant's
bill had not been paid and after the ninety-day lien filing period had
run, the lien claimant compelled the owner to make a subsequent
order of insignificant materials.143 There was an abundance of evi-
dence introduced at trial which showed the order of materials to be a
sham made solely for the purpose of reviving the lien.144
The court had little difficulty in denying the lien claimant's lien for
untimely filing. The court went on to hold that materialmen, who
have substantially completed an improvement project, may not ex-
tend the lien filing period by merely furnishing additional mate-
rial. 14 5 The court will look to the intent and significance of the
additionally furnished material as well as the time gap between sub-
stantial completion of the improvement. 146 This examination into
the nature of the transaction is necessary because "[a] lien cannot be
kept alive by purposely and unnecessarily delaying the completion of
the contract in minor and unimportant particulars for that
purpose."147
An examination of the general rules emanating from Bisbee, indi-
cates that their application requires the court to address a number of
difficult factual questions. First, the court must determine whether
the contract has been substantially completed. Second, the court
must determine if the additional contribution of material or labor is
significant. Third, the court must determine whether the delay in fur-
nishing the additional material or labor was of an unreasonable
140. See supra note 138.
141. 159 Minn. 442, 199 N.W. 17 (1923).
142. Id. at 444, 199 N.W. at 18.
143. Id. at 445, 199 N.W. at 18. The owner's business went into receivership
shortly after the insignificant order was made. The owner probably made the addi-
tional order to remain on good terms with the lien claimant and with the realization
that his creditors ultimately would suffer from the lien claim.
144. Id. There were letters between the parties indicating that the intent of the
later shipment of tiles was for mechanics' lien claim purposes. Id. Furthermore, the
shipment of tiles was minimal and the tiles were never used. Id.
145. Id. at 446, 199 N.W. at 18.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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length. Finally, and most importantly, the court must determine
whether the additional supply of material or labor was solely for the
purpose of extending the lien.
Each of these questions allow for a highly subjective response.
The combination of all the questions is a recipe for uncertainty and
confusion. Indeed, the case law in this area demonstrates some
inconsistency.148
Courts have found that the aforementioned analysis does not work
well with continuing or multi-project contracts.' 49 The general rule
for this situation was enunciated in Paine & Nixon Co. v. Dahl Vick. 150
The court in Paine looked at the overall nature of the project. If it
appears that the overall project is a single project or "one continu-
ous work," then, regardless of the number of agreements for the fur-
nishing of goods or services, a lien claim filed within the statutory
period of the last item preserves a lien for all.151 If, however, the
overall nature of the project indicates that the series of contracts are
separate and unrelated, then a lien claim filed will not extend back
beyond the statutory period.152 In other words, each contract for the
furnishing of materials or labor will have a separate statutory lien
filing period. The difficulties inherent in this analysis were recog-
nized by the court when it noted that "[t]he application of these two
doctrines to the varying facts of particular cases is often attended
with difficulty." 153
The rule stated in Paine calls for an additional rule to determine
148. See, e.g., Kahle, 255 Minn. at 243, 96 N.W.2d at 247 (lien filing period ex-
tended by the installation of a hot-air register over a year after the initial furnace
installation was completed); W.B. Martin Lumber Co. v. Noss, 256 Minn. 471, 474,
99 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1959) (when a company had delivered two pairs of shutters two
months after all the other lumber deliveries were completed, the time for filing was
extended); Enviro-Fab, 349 N.W.2d at 846-47 (lien filing date extended when lien
claimant sent a gasket for a tank that it had supplied and upon which the statutory
lien filing period had run). But see Hayle Floor Covering, 253 N.W.2d at 812-13 (lien
denied when lien claimant returned to the site and moved some equipment and
materials, originally intended for the improvement, to another location); Villaume
Box & Lumber Co. v. Condon, 146 Minn. 156, 158-59, 178 N.W. 492, 493 (1923)
(lien period not extended for claimant who supplied additional storm sashes some
time after the lien filing period expired); Dayton, 63 Minn. at 48, 65 N.W. at 133
(liens were denied where more than three and one-half months after the job was
done, the lien claimants returned to the job and spent two hours adjusting the
doors).
149. See, e.g., Rochester's Suburban Lumber Co. v. Slocumb, 282 Minn. 124, 129-
30, 163 N.W.2d 303, 307 (1968); Barrett v. Hampe, 237 Minn. 80, 82-84, 53 N.W.2d
803, 805-06 (1952); Paine & Nixon Co. v. Dahl Vick, 136 Minn. 57, 59, 161 N.W. 257,
257 (1917); Enviro-Fab, 349 N.W.2d at 846.
150. 136 Minn. 57, 161 N.W. 257 (1917).
151. Id. at 58, 161 N.W.2d at 257.
152. Id. at 59, 161 N.W.2d at 257.
153. Id.
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whether ajob consists of "one continuous work" or consists of sepa-
rate contracts. This distinction was addressed in Kahle v. McClary 154
where the court noted:
Where work, distinct in its nature, is performed at different times,
the law supposes it performed under distinct engagements, as
where the work at one time is for building, and at another for re-
pairing. So, where two distinct contracts are in fact made, as ...
distinct contracts for different parts of the work, the work done
under each contract must be considered as entire of itself. But
when work etc. is done or furnished, all going to the same general
purpose, as the building of a house, or any of its parts, though such
work, etc., be ordered and done, at different times, yet, if the sev-
eral parts form an entire whole, or are so connected together as to
show that the parties had it in contemplation that the whole should
form but one, and not distinct matters of settlement, the whole ac-
count must be treated as a unit, or as being but a single
contract. ' 55
An examination of the facts of Kahle demonstrates just how liber-
ally such general rules can be applied. In Kahle, the lien claimant
entered into a verbal agreement to install a new heating system for
the defendant.156 On August 9, 1955, work began on the project.
The entire furnace installation was completed in late September,
1955.157 During the following winter, it was discovered that the
heating system was inadequate. The lien claimant agreed to install
another hot air register.158 The additional register was not installed
until one year following the completion of the furnace project. The
cost of the hot-air register was only twenty eight dollars.159 By tak-
ing a substantial rather than technical view,160 the court determined
that this entire transaction involved one contract thus entitling the
mechanics' lien claimant to the lien on the entire installation.161
It seems unlikely that the legislature, in establishing the 120 day
lien filing period, envisioned a fourteen month extension. ' 62 Equally
unlikely is that the owner would have authorized the minor addition
had he realized that the lien filing period would thereby be extended.
Adding further uncertainty to the validity of the Kahle holding is
Minnesota's subsequent adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.
154. 255 Minn. 239, 96 N.W.2d 243 (1959).
155. Id. at 241, 96 N.W.2d at 245-46 (quoting Hazard Powder Co. v. Loomis &
Campbell, 13 Ohio Dec. Reprint 333, 337 (1859)).
156. Id. at 240, 96 N.W.2d at 244.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 242, 96 N.W.2d at 246.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Under the Uniform Commmercial Code, the warranty sections' 63
would most likely apply to the inadequate heating system, thus al-
lowing the property owner a variety of remedies. It seems inconceiv-
able that a lien claimant could reap the windfall that the lien claimant
in Kahle did simply because the property owner exercised his rights
under the Uniform Commercial Code.
A particularly troublesome aspect of Kahle is that, in spite of the
unfair result to the property owner, the analysis of the general rules
supported the decision. Since the court's analysis was correct, the
problem then must lie with the general rules.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed this issue recently in
Enviro-Fab, Inc. v. Blandin Paper Co. 164 In Enviro-Fab, the lien claimant
agreed to fabricate seven tanks for $29,000, install a fly ash silo for
$42,000, and erect a clarifier for $34,000.165 The tanks were in-
stalled and paid for in early 1980. On June 24, 1980, the lien claim-
ant completed erection of the clarifier but was not paid. t66 Due to
circumstances beyond either party's control, problems arose con-
cerning completion of the fly ash silo. 167 Following numerous un-
successful negotiations, the contract was repudiated and terminated
on September 15, 1980.168
On September 16, 1980, the lien claimant, at defendant's request,
sent a gasket for one of the tanks it had installed. On November 7,
1980, approximately four and one-half months after completing the
work on the clarifier, the lien claimant filed its lien.169
The court, in allowing the lien, determined that the entire relation-
ship between the lien claimant and defendant was based on a single
unitary contract.' 70 This conclusion was based on the court's belief
that "[a]ll agreements were contemplated at the same time and were
not an afterthought."17 1 The court denied the defendant's argu-
ment that the contracts were separate because the clarifier and silo
agreements were documented on "subcontract agreements" and the
tank agreement was documented on a "purchase order."t 72
There are several troubling aspects about the holding in Enviro-
Fab. As in Kahle, the lien claimant's date for filing a lien statement is
163. U.C.C. § 2-313 to -315 (1978).
164. 349 N.W.2d 842 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
165. Id. at 845.
166. Id.
167. Id. Apparently there was a union jurisdictional dispute which was creating
costly delays in the project. Id.
168. Id. It was the general contractor who repudiated the contract.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 847.
171. Id.
172. Id. The items were written up in different manners because the elements of
the project involved part material and part on-site labor. Id.
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substantially extended for a trifling item. It is inconceivable that
property owners understand the consequences of allowing lien
claimants to supply such minimal items of material or labor. The
Enviro-Fab court seems to justify this result noting: "Respondent had
no need to send a gasket on September 16, 1980, to extend the time,
since there was still sufficient time in which to file."173 This fact is
not only irrelevant to the determination of whether a lien statement
is timely filed, it also violates the policy of strictly construing the
mechanics' lien statutes that determine whether a mechanics' lien at-
taches or not. 174
The court's conclusion that the parties intended that the insignifi-
cant gasket transaction was merely part of one unitary contract is un-
convincing.175 Even if the parties were operating under one
contract, that contract was repudiated and terminated. 176 This sug-
gests that further performance according to the contract is no longer
required of either party.177 If this is the case, the gasket must have
been sent pursuant to a separate contractual arrangement. Any lien
statement filed more than 120 days after the June 24, 1980, comple-
tion of the clarifier necessarily includes only the gasket.
The foregoing case study indicates that the date of the last work or
furnishing of skill, material, or machinery is a difficult question.
Many additional questions arise under the present statutory analysis.
173. Id.
174. See Dolder v. Griffin, 323 N.W.2d 773, 780 (Minn. 1982).
175. The court apparently used a contractural analysis in determining the parties'
intent when reaching the agreement. Recall that courts look at the language of a
contract as well as the surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the par-
ties. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 537-38 (1982). This analysis is used to
determine what rights and obligations the parties anticipated when entering the con-
tract.
While this analysis is useful in settling contract disputes, it is not entirely clear
that such an analysis is appropriate in the context of mechanics' liens. Even if the
parties in Enviro-Fab had informally agreed the lien claimant was to furnish materials
and services under a unitary agreement, can it be said that the property owner was
aware or intended that his property be subject to such broad mechanics' lien liability?
It is more reasonable to assume that the parties group the various material and ser-
vice aspects of the project into a single agreement merely as an expedient bookkeep-
ing measure.
Perhaps a more fact specific approach is more appropriate in determining the
various aspects of an improvement project. In the present case, the mechanics' lien
claimant was responsible for the delivery of seven assembled tanks. In addition, it
was responsible for performing on-site work for a different aspect of the project. It
would have been elementary for the court to have separated the two aspects of the
lien claim into a material agreement and a labor agreement. This would have been a
fairer result to the property owner especially in light of the late filing by the lien
claimant.
176. 349 N.W.2d at 845.
177. See CORBIN, supra note 175, § 1229 .
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Persons involved in the construction industry as well as the courts
require more certainty than the present statute provides. Any modi-
fications of the law in this area should make certainty a primary
concern.
2. Recommendations
Just as the notice of commencement concept injects certainty into
the area of lien priority, a notice of completion concept would have
the same effect in the area of filing lien statements. Although no
states presently have a mandatory notice of completion recording
statute, many states provide for optional recordation.178 An exami-
nation of one such statute is beneficial at this point.
Arizona has an optional "notice of completion" recordation stat-
ute. 17 9 This device is used for lien filing purposes to indicate just
exactly when the improvement is complete. A notice of completion
is defined as "a written notice which the owner or his agent may elect
to record at any time after the completion of construction ... for the
purpose of shortening the lien period."80
The rationale for shortening the time period is that all parties will
know exactly when completion occurs. Also, because of the notice of
completion requirements, all parties will know who to file liens
against, thus eliminating the post-construction search for the
owner. 18'
One commentator on the Arizona notice of completion statute
noted that an optional recording statute is satisfactory since "in al-
most all cases involving lenders the notice of completion will be
filed; the lender will insist on the right to do so. The shorter lien
recording period.., allows a lender to finalize a project much earlier
(50% earlier)."182
According to the Arizona statute, a properly filed notice of com-
pletion must include:
1) the name and address of the owner or owners;
2) the nature of the interest or estate of the owner;
3) the address and legal description of the job site;
178. ALAsKA STAT. § 34.35.072 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-993 (1984);
CAL. Cxv. CODE § 3093 (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 507-43 (1976); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 71-3-511 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 87.045 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-
143 (1982).
179. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-993 (Supp. 1985).
180. Id. § 33-993C.
181. Paragraph F requires the owner to mail by certified or registered mail a copy
of the recorded notice of completion to all interested parties. Id. § 33-993F.
182. Irvine, Mechanics' & Materialmens' Liens: Major Modifications in Arizona Law, 15
ARIZ. B.J. 27, 35 (Feb. 1980).
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4) the name of the original contractor, if any.183
Minnesota should adopt a mandatory notice of completion
scheme. Some modification of the Arizona statute is necessary to
provide maximum certainty. Logistically, such an addition to Minne-
sota mechanics' lien law would be relatively problem free.184
One concern of this system is determining when an owner may
file.185 The determination of the date that an owner must file a no-
tice of completion must avoid the pitfalls present in Minnesota's cur-
rent law.186 A better recommendation would be to allow the owner
to make a good-faith determination of when to file a notice of com-
pletion. Once recorded, any subsequent improvements would be
considered pursuant to a separate contract.
To prevent potential abuse by owners, certain safeguards could be
employed. First, filing a notice of completion could have the effect
of owner-acceptance of the improvement at that point. Contractors
and their subcontractors would then be entitled to payment. This
would preclude the owner from prematurely filing a notice of com-
pletion thereby requiring lien claimants to file separate lien state-
ments for the work done before and after the filing of the notice of
completion.
Hardship to owners caused by equating acceptance with filing a
notice of completion could be avoided by adopting some Uniform
Commercial Code principles. An acceptance based on recording a
notice of completion could be revoked if:
1) the defect is substantial;
2) the defect was not reasonably discoverable or the contractor
made assurances that no defects exist; and
3) the rejection occurs within a reasonable time.187
It must also be remembered that, generally, an owner would still be
entitled to withhold payment from a contractor for 120 days.' 88 This
period is a substantial period of time to discover any defects. Addi-
tionally, contractual remedies are always available to owners.
183. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-993C (Supp. 1985).
184. The lien filing period would not have to be shortened. Owner notification of
interested parties would not be burdensome since current Minnesota law requires all
potential lien claimants to notify owners of their identity. See MINN. STAT. § 514.011
(1984).
185. A concern in the notice of completion statutes is that owners may file the
notice too early, which may result in lien claimants finding the lien filing period run-
ning much earlier than expected. However, this concern is less real than imagined as
long as lien claimants are given notice of the recording of the notice of completion.
186. The problem of determining when the last labor or materials, etc. were fur-
nished would be eliminated if an exact date was established when an owner must file
a notice of completion.
187. See U.C.C. § 2-608 (1978).
188. MINN. STAT. § 514.07.
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The benefits derived by a notice of completion recording system
outweigh any incidental burdens on ignorant parties. The system is
simple and would not require a major overhaul of the Minnesota
mechanics' lien statute. Most importantly, a "notice of recording"
system is sensitive to the need for certainty in the vital construction
industry.
CONCLUSION
The mechanics' lien statute was enacted in Minnesota to prevent
owners from receiving the goods and services of subcontractors and
material without paying for them. Without this protection, such per-
sons were without remedy since they were not in privity of contract
with the owners. Certainly, such protection stimulates the extension
of credit for construction.
For the most part, Minnesota's mechanics' lien statute is well
drafted. It represents a fairly balanced approach to the competing
interests served by mechanics' liens. However, as has been seen, the
Minnesota's mechanics' lien statute contains some noteworthy prob-
lem areas. The volume of litigation resulting from these "gray ar-
eas" demands legislative attention.
The legislature could remedy this situation by adopting some form
of notification outlined in this discussion. By requiring the recorda-
tion of both the commencement and the completion of the improve-
ment, additional certainty could be injected into an otherwise well
drafted mechanics' lien statute.
Mark R. Wild
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